Natural Law and Providence:
Exploring the Ancient Understanding of Cosmic Order and Human Society

Joseph Milne

Talk given to the Henry George Foundation 2009

One of the questions that we cannot help asking continuously is, Why is the concept of Natural Law so difficult to grasp in our age? Since every person is a social and political being, it would seem completely natural that we should understand the nature of human society, and that our laws and institutions should be based on and reflect such understanding. I would suggest that, in a certain sense, everyone does understand Natural Law. We all believe that Justice should always be performed, and that any kind of injustice done by the state is the worst kind of injustice. Even children object to anything unfair. So we all have what might be called an intuitive sense of justice, and in that sense an intuition of Natural Law. Our difficulty would seem to lie in an inability to fully articulate in both theoretical and practical terms what our intelligence already knows in essence.

It is very clear in the writings of Henry George that he had the gift of articulating the fundamental laws of economics both theoretically and practically. He believed that it belonged to everyone to do the same, because all have the gift of reason and the power to discern the truth of things. Over the years many millions of people have recognised the truth of his writings, and in particular his understanding of economic Justice. But also outstanding thinkers, such as Einstein, Tolstoy and Churchill, acknowledged the exceptional insights of Henry George. Yet, for all that, our modern society at large cannot see how natural laws indicate the way in which society might be ordered to flourish in freedom and entirely without poverty.

Why is this? I am sure there are many ways in which that question may be fruitfully pursued. One way, which has proved very illuminating to me, is to explore a group of concepts which once all belonged together, but which in our time have got separated, or even become incomprehensible. I mean the concepts of Providence, the Good, and Destiny. For Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century (1225 - 1274) these three concepts all belong to the universal conception of Natural Law, and his understanding goes back to the Stoics, Aristotle and Plato. The essential feature of the connection between these concepts is that the laws of Nature are connected to divine laws of eternity, and this connection brings all things to unity under the ideal of the Good or perfection. For example Aquinas says:

In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (Summa Theologica, I, 22, 1).

For Aquinas created things are at once good in themselves but also in that they are oriented towards ultimate Good itself. This means that everything that exists naturally seeks the universal good of all things, or of the whole universe, and ultimately participation in the divine goodness from which all things receive their being. In seeing the created world in this way the different aspects of Nature become united in a single end, and this single end is also the end which brings each particular being to its full actuality or flourishing. The universal qualities which draw all things to their proper end in the Good are Providence and Destiny, from which are derived Justice and Natural Law.

This view, which can be traced back through the Middle Ages and into Roman law and to the earliest Greek philosophers in one form or another, and which Aquinas articulates most clearly in his so-called Treatise on Natural Law in the Summa Theologia, got lost in the turmoil of the birth of Protestantism and the Reformation. Owing to the conflicts both within Christianity and between the Church and the State, the metaphysical and theological understanding of the link between the natural world and the divine order was broken. From this situation the Enlightenment thinkers arose who attempted to understand the natural world through reason alone without recourse to the divine or transcendent.

From our point of view this meant that the huge expenditure of thought given to Law, and especially to Natural Law, was confined to understanding the laws of human society in a restricted way, and in particular ways which separated the immediate concerns of life from the final end. The first to articulate this way of thinking about Natural law was Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645) who coined the phrase 'as if God did not exist' (Etsi Deus non daretur). The idea was that the truth of things remained the same whether or not God was presupposed, and therefore human reason was sufficient in itself to discern the truth of things. Grotius was not an atheist. One of his main works was entitled On the Truth of the Christian Religion. His concern, typical of his times, was to demonstrate the truth of things without resorting simply to the authority of the Church or the scholastics. While for the Medieval scholars the chief concern was to harmonise the two orders of knowledge given through reason and revelation, this degenerated into a conflict between reason and authority, within the Church itself, so we need to be aware of the difficulties confronting the first Enlightenment thinkers.

However, it was not long before the entire exercise of the Enlightenment thinking ceased to be able to find any connection between the truths derived through reason and the truths given through revelation, and so the Creation, or the natural world, became wholly separated from the divine, and the conception of God became reduced to a mere 'first cause' wholly outside of the universe. Thus was born the secular world view. And so we find that among the sceptical philosophers, such as Hume, that even our rational knowledge is limited to mere sensory impressions and that the whole realm of metaphysics must be discounted along with the realm of divinity or revelation.

And so the unified cosmology which once had held together the mysteries of the Infinite and finite, the created and the uncreated, Nature and Grace and so on was lost. Not only did the universe become fragmented, it also became smaller. And even with the smaller universe the internal relations between its parts became obscured, and, in terms of the understanding of Natural Law, the primary way in which this manifested was in the idea that human society itself was outside Nature. It was on the basis of this assumption that the ideas of utilitarianism and the social contract arose, and the notion that the 'state' was a seat of power rather than the mediator of Justice. Ironically, in its rebellion against the authority of the Church, the state adopted the very qualities in itself it had opposed. So dominant is the idea that the State and power are one and the same thing that we hardly notice that Aristotle, in his Politics, never conceives the idea of the Polis in terms of power but in terms of ethics. Even Marx, who so many regard as thinking outside the established presuppositions about society, conceives the State in terms of power and society in terms of conflicting powers.

I think it is worth noting that the thinkers who came straight after Hugo Grotius, such as Hume, Locke and Adam Smith, were familiar with the classical writings and Aquinas which clearly expressed the notion of Natural Law, and some to a certain extent attempted to accommodate it in their own theories of society. Yet without the ancient understanding of a unified and purposeful cosmos, the developed human society could never be placed within the greater order of Nature. Coupled with the exclusion of the authority of the Church, these thinkers were forced to conceive society within a very limited conception of Nature, as well as a very limited conception of human nature.

We have to bear in mind that the very essence of Natural Law lies in the connection between human nature and universal nature. With this connection broken, and with Nature itself reduced to mere mechanical processes, there is no place for the purposeful operation of a cosmic Providence. In terms of Greek philosophy, this means the absence of any teleology or direction in Nature. Let me explain this because it is very important.

For Plato, and even more for Aristotle, Nature or physis is a living, intelligent being. The most important aspect of this is that it is self-moving, which means it is always underway towards the fullest being. All the processes we observe in Nature are the visible seeking of perfection, of everything flowering to the fullest extent possible according to its nature, and ultimately striving towards the Good. Each thing, or each being, is oriented towards its own perfection and the perfection of the universe as a whole. Each being is drawn towards higher forms of being within the unity of the whole. Each being, by nature, acts on behalf of the whole, and in this way comes to the fullest being according to its own particular nature. So Nature, for the Greek philosophers, is neither static nor random. This is what is meant by the teleology of things in Greek philosophy. In Plato's Laws the Athenian Stranger says:

[ATHENIAN: Let us say to the youth:] The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it. Over these, down to the least fraction of them, ministers have been appointed to preside, who have wrought out their perfection with infinitesimal exactness. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, unhappy man, which, however little, contributes to the whole; and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may be blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. (Plato, Laws Book X, 903, translation by B. Jowett)

In terms of Natural Law, the most important aspect of this is that each part of Nature, or each being, is inclined within itself towards perfection. Thus Aristotle says in the opening of his Metaphysics that the mind is naturally inclined towards the truth of things. This is at once its nature and its end. And so with all things. Their orientation towards perfection springs from their natures, and so the teleology of things is not imposed by a power outside themselves, but resides in their own natures. Above and beyond this we have universal Providence, the overall providential order of the universe which provides the conditions in which all things may be fulfilled according to their particular destinies, and which corrects whatever goes amiss. Plotinus describes it this way:

All such right-doing, then, is linked to Providence; but it is not therefore performed by it: men or other agents, living or lifeless, are causes of certain things happening, and any good that may result is taken up again by Providence. In the total, then, the right rules and what has happened amiss is transformed and corrected. (Plotinus Enneads, III, 3, 5, translated by S. MacKenna.)

From these considerations it becomes clear that the ancient understanding of the order of Nature is not deterministic, and that Providence should not be thought of as a kind of determinism. And this gives us a clearer indication of the nature of Natural Law insofar as it touches human society. It is not a set of rules which are imposed upon society, as positive law is, but rather it indicates the potential way in which society may fulfil its own nature within the greater cosmic scheme. It is on a plane above that of necessity, a possibility for which Providence has made provision. We might say that, at the level of the political society, it is the law of human potential. This means, of course, that it must be consciously chosen if it is to be realised.

Let me offer a reflection on something that has often struck me while exploring the tradition of Natural Law. At the beginning of this talk we asked why it is that the concept of Natural Law is so difficult to grasp in our age. I have suggested that one reason is because we have lost the holistic sense of cosmos which was fundamental to the ancient formulations of Natural Law, but which was lost during the 17th century. Here I think we find another reason, which springs from Natural Law and human nature themselves. The Natural Law may be understood only through conscious reflection, through deliberate enquiry into the truth of things.

This itself shows us something very important about human nature and society. Nature, under Providence, gives us the earth and our bodies and our faculties as a gift, but beyond that the 'work' of mankind belongs to mankind to take up of itself, and central to what may properly be called the 'work' of mankind is the task of understanding the nature of things. As various philosophers have said in different ways, man is the being who reflects on the nature of being. This task is not simply the vocation of each individual person, it is also the collective work of society as a whole. From this I think we can see a simple law, which itself is a reflection of Natural Law: that the conditions of society at any time reflect the degree to which it understands itself. Society is, so to speak, the embodiment of human understanding. To put that another way, society flourishes insofar as it understands its own nature.

It is at this point that Nature and Providence and ethics converge. Once Nature gives to humanity the powers of reflection and speech, humanity becomes responsible for carrying out its own part in the universal order of Nature. The Stoics held that virtue is action in agreement with Nature, in agreement with the greater order and purpose of things. For Plotinus this is action according to Providence, towards the common good. It is often said that the Stoic view is deterministic, but this is because it is overlooked that to act in agreement with Nature is also to act according to human nature and its potential perfection. There is an implicit correspondence or affinity between human nature and the cosmos, and this means that human nature cannot be itself if separated from the cosmic nature or the whole. In a sense, human nature comes to itself through its perception and action in the cosmic order. Nature is the mirror in which man sees himself. It is obvious that humanity is part of nature at the physical level. Separated from it we should die. But at the reflective or rational level this participation in Nature is much more subtle. It steps from the level of absolute dependency to that of moral responsibility. To put that another way, it steps from the level of mere survival to that of the Good.

One of the things that distinguishes the ancient philosophers' thought on ethics, which I believe is very important in understanding Natural Law, is that they understood that everything in Nature is inclined towards the Good, or towards perfection, as we observed earlier, and, at the deepest level of being, everything acts for the sake of the greater whole. In this sense ethics belongs to the law of being as such, since 'being' and the 'good' cannot be separated from one another. This also means that individual being and being as such cannot be separated from one another, and this relation is also ethical.

It was on this point that the Enlightenment thinkers broke with the ancient tradition. They located the inclinations of creatures, including those of mankind, in the desire or instinct for self-preservation, and we can see how that notion has been taken up in modern neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. This meant that instead of all things being harmoniously oriented towards the universal good, each particular being was placed in essential conflict with every other being. And so reflection on the law and jurisprudence in society began to be thought of in terms of mediating conflict between individuals within society, or between individuals and institutions, rather than as the conformation to the natural order. It is from this conception that the notions of the social contract or utilitarianism arose, and the Kantian deontological theory of ethics, or ethics as duty or rule. Although the expression 'the common good' remained, it was now reduced to mediating conflicting interests. It was in these conditions that the thinking on Natural Law shifted to that of natural Rights, and later again to that of Human Rights. With these shifts in thought the inherent connection between society and the cosmic order is lost. Society itself becomes an entity outside Nature serving only itself, with no part in any greater cosmic scheme or destiny. These are rather sweeping assertions, so by way of contrast it is worth seeing how Thomas Aquinas expresses the order of Nature and how it is oriented towards the universal good:

By nature parts of the body will risk themselves in order to defend the whole: without thinking, the hand wards off the blow that will harm the whole body. And in society virtue imitates nature, so that the good citizen risks death for the common good; if he were a part of society by nature it would be a natural tendency. Now by nature every creature by being himself belongs to God; so that natural love of angels and men is first and foremost for God and then for themselves. If it were not so, their natural love would be perverse and would have to be destroyed rather than fulfilled by the love of charity. One naturally loves oneself more than something else of equal rank because one is more united to oneself, but if the other thing is the entire ground of one's own existence and goodness then by nature one loves it more than oneself: by nature parts love the whole more than themselves, and individuals the good of the species more than their individual good. God however is not only the good of a species but good as such and for all; and so by nature everything loves God in its own way more than itself. Since God is everything's good and naturally loved by all, no one can see him for what he is and not love him. But when we do not see him and know him only through some effect or other which displeases us, we may hate God in that respect; though even then as the good of all we still by nature love him more than ourselves. (Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica I. 60.5)

In this passage the whole modern theory of 'enlightened self-interest' or individualism is exposed as a very limited view of society and the greater scheme of reality. Also the modern theories of human rights is made redundant. The truth is the reverse. On the other hand, modern ecology is now more in accord with Aquinas's view of Nature, insofar as it understands how all the different species belong to a dynamic whole in which the balance of the whole is what sustains each part. Nevertheless, there is no universal teleology in the ethical thought which springs from the present concern for the environment. Even Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis remains within the sphere of the Newtonian mechanistic universe, in which all things are subject to law, but have no real ends or purpose.

This is where Aquinas's view of Nature, which he has assembled and synthesised from the main features of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic cosmology, grounds the whole of Nature in the highest principle of the Good from which all things emanate and towards which all things strive for unity and completion. Thus the very moving force of Nature is the Good in itself, which Aquinas locates in God. For Aquinas it is the very highest end of things that makes them intelligible in their immediate presence and natures. Although he speaks firmly within the Christian tradition, his manner of thinking is that of the philosophers and thinkers who went before him who sought to understand things from their highest principles first - that is, metaphysically.

I am sure we have all heard it said that Medieval Christianity disregarded this world, seeing the fulfilment of man in the next world. But this is not true. What is commonly mistaken for a concern for angels and metaphysical abstractions is really enquiry into the principles of the creation, but from the highest level downwards. Plato, again in Book X of the Laws, argues that Soul and the gods exist prior to the physical elements, because they are their governing principles. The Athenian stranger says:

Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and the works of nature, . . . these will follow and be under the government of art and mind. (Plato Laws, Book X, 892, translated by B. Jowett)

Here Plato is challenging those who claim that the material elements exist prior to the soul and the gods, a claim which obstructs enquiry into law and the proper order of society. For Plato a choice must be made between seeing things in terms of the highest universal principles, or according to the lowest common denominator. In relation to understanding Natural Law and society a choice has to be made between seeing lawfulness as springing from the essence of human community, or as rules that need to be imposed upon essentially lawless beings. In terms of how we conceive ethics this is enormously important. Either we go with Plato and Aristotle and see human nature as oriented towards the Good, which means that the laws of society come into being naturally, or else we see human nature as essentially self-interested, which means that laws need to be formulated to subdue the natural human inclinations and desires. The first way of seeing human nature, as naturally oriented towards the good, opens the way to connecting Natural Law with what is now called 'virtue ethics', the ethics that brings action into agreement with Nature. The second way of seeing human nature, as essentially self-interested, cannot accommodate Natural Law and is compelled to conceive law in terms of imposed rules and sanctions.

The choice between these two views also effects the way in which human rights are conceived - either in terms of the natural constitution of human society and therefore already given in the nature of things, or in terms of the individual making claims upon society which would otherwise be denied. I suspect that most people are not really clear where they stand on this because the ethical ground for human rights is not generally reflected on. Rights are merely asserted. Yet where our thinking takes its beginning is of the utmost importance. As an illustration of this there is a very perceptive passage in an essay by the Natural Law philosopher John Finnis. He takes issue with a claim made by Robert Novick that 'everything comes into the world already attached to someone having an entitlement over it'. Finnis writes:

. . . - the reality being, on the contrary, that the natural resources from which everything made has been made pre-exist all entitlements and 'came into the world' attached to nobody in particular; the world's resources are fundamentally common and no theory of entitlements can rightly appropriate any resource to one person so absolutely as to negate that original community of the world's stock. .(John Finnis, 'Natural Law and Legal Reasoning', in Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, edited by Robert George, Oxford, 2007, p. 139)

I am sure I need not persuade anyone here that John Finnis is clearly right. But he is right because he thinks from essential principle, while Novick based his thought on what seemed to be already the practice, or that there was no distinction to be drawn between what Nature provides and what is produced through human labour. Aquinas also begins from the principle that all property is held in common. This has to be the basis from which any theory of entitlement may be developed, both in terms of property and of rights. Aquinas, very interestingly, does not develop a theory of property on the basis of entitlement, but rather on the basis of responsibility. He notes that, since the fall, things held in common tend to be neglected, therefore individual ownership should be given to individuals who may be held responsible for the care for those things.

The step from the principle of communal property to individual ownership is thus a step from the eternal principle of Natural Law to what Aquinas calls 'custom', by which he means the positive laws which suite time and place and tradition. Custom may vary from one state to another, or change over time within one state, but always it should accord with the principles of Natural Law which never change. One way in which the principle of common property may be shown to remain the basis of any custom of entitlement is when there is shortage or famine. In these conditions even the laws of theft may be nullified, according to Aquinas. John Finnis remarks on this also, saying in a footnote:

But the most obvious implication is the principle that in conditions of scarcity and deprivation, goods become once again common just to the extent necessary to allow those in danger to appropriate what they need to avert e. g. starvation; this moral principle can qualify even the legal definitions of theft . . .(John Finnis, 'Natural Law and Legal Reasoning', in Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, edited by Robert George, Oxford, 2007, p. 153 n. 12)

If entitlement may revert back to common property and set aside the legal definitions of theft in times of scarcity or need, then this raises the question of the foundation in principle of human rights, especially as the modern list of human rights seems to be continuously extending. In the light of what has just been said about property entitlements being part of legal custom, rather than of Natural Law as such, perhaps it may also be said that the legal definitions of human rights are also part of legal custom, and that these claims to rights might also revert back to 'render to each his due' in terms of Natural Law. Maybe. I would like to suggest, however, that current thinking on human rights has become very muddled and in many instances it is trying to mitigate the consequences of failing to observe Natural Law in the understanding of the nature of society, and that the universal Providence has already accounted for the just needs of humanity and ordered the earth and Nature in such a way that human society might flourish to its full potential within the greater cosmic scheme oriented towards the universal Good.

There is, then, a Providence, which permeates the Kosmos from first to last, not everywhere equal, as in a numerical distribution, but proportioned, differing, according to the grades of place - just as in some one animal, linked from first to last, each member has its own function, the nobler organ the higher activity while others successively concern the lower degrees of the life, each part acting of itself, and experiencing what belongs to its own nature and what comes from its relation with every other. (Plotinus Enneads, III, 3, 5, translated by S. MacKenna)